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COMMENT: RAY V. ESPN, INC. AND THE NEED
FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN COPYRIGHT
PREEMPTION ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT OF
PUBLICITY IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
Thomas Hwang*
The Eighth Circuit’s recent decision in Ray v. ESPN, Inc., while
reaching the correct outcome of preemption, marks a missed opportunity to
develop the complicated and confusing discourse at the intersection of
federal copyright protection and right of publicity claims arising from state
laws. This Comment traces the development of the right of publicity from
its historical roots in the right of privacy to its modern manifestation of
providing protection against the unauthorized commercial use of a person’s
likeness or identity by another. This Comment also explores the
Congressional intent behind the Copyright Act of 1976 and its attempts to
unify the then separate federal and state copyright law landscape under a
single federal copyright protection system where federal law preempts state
law when they conflict. Noting the complicated and inconsistent
application by courts of the preemption doctrine of the Copyright Act over
state law right of publicity claims, this Comment proposes a solution
utilizing a modified version of Professor Nimmer’s two-prong preemption
test that would allow for more consistent predictions of how courts will
determine preemption cases.

* 2017 J.D./Tax LL.M. Candidate, Loyola Law School. Special thanks to Mona Ahn.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Remembering and reliving classic moments in sports history is part of
the beloved tradition of being a sports fan. The proliferation of sportshistory programming and documentaries commemorating influential or
significant moments in athletics evidences the culture of sports fandom’s
dedication to reliving those moments.1 However, before those athletic
matches and moments could carve their iconic place in sports history, they
had to be relayed and broadcasted to the masses beyond those spectators
who were physically present. Predictably, given the commercial nature of
sports broadcasts, conflict arose between the athletes and participants who
asserted their individual and collective rights and the infrastructure that
facilitated those broadcasts.2
The right of publicity has long been an embedded issue in the world
of professional sports.3 Federal copyright law has often conflicted with
state law right of publicity issues, further complicating how courts
approach the already complicated right of publicity claims.4 This history
has divided courts and has resulted in inconsistency in analyzing right of
publicity claims and copyright issues.5
1. See What is 30 for 30?, ESPN, http://www.espn.com/30for30 [http://perma.cc/N287NQF7] (“With each documentary, the filmmakers brought their passion and personal approach to
the screen, detailing the issues, trends, athletes, teams, rivalries, games and moments that have
transformed the sports landscape from 1979 to 2009.”). See generally ESPN 25: ESPN Counts
Down the 100 Most Memorable Moments of the Past 25 Years, ESPN,
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/espn25/moments [http://perma.cc/YC55-4RMA].
2. Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. MLB Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 666 (7th Cir. 1986) (involving
a right of publicity claim by numerous Major League Baseball players regarding the use of their
likeness in television broadcasts of games in which they participated); see also Dryer v. NFL, 55
F. Supp. 3d 1181, 1186 (D. Minn. 2014) (involving a right of publicity claim by former
professional football players and the production of historical films by the NFL).
3. Justin B. Bryant, Article, Applying the Lessons from Dryer v. NFL: Forming a
Workable Framework for Analyzing the Right of Publicity in Professional Sports, 22 SPORTS
LAW. J. 1, 2 (2015).
4. See Kristen E. Riccard, Comment, Product Placement or Pure Entertainment?
Critiquing a Copyright-Preemption Proposal, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 427, 429 (2009) (“Neither
Congress nor the Supreme Court has a clear standard to determine when a federal copyright claim
should trump a state right of publicity claim.”).
5. Bryant, supra note 3, at 2 (“That long history . . . has only served to complicate the
evaluation of right-of-publicity claims, rather than help provide a consistent doctrinal framework
for courts . . . .”). See generally Robert J. Bernstein & Robert W. Clarida, Copyright Law; Does
Copyright Preempt the Right of Publicity?, N.Y. L.J. (ONLINE), Mar. 18, 2005, LEXIS.
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The Eighth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals failed to
make progress in addressing and resolving the inconsistency in how courts
analyze conflicts between right of publicity claims and federal copyright
law in its April 2015 opinion, Ray v. ESPN, Inc.6 There, former
professional wrestler Steve “Wild Thing” Ray brought suit alleging state
law claims against ESPN, Inc. and its subsidiaries (ESPN) for rebroadcasting old wrestling matches in which he participated.7 Despite
arriving at the correct result in the federal copyright preemption issue of
Ray’s state law claims,8 the Eighth Circuit missed an opportunity to make
any meaningful additions to the current, yet insufficient, framework of state
law right of publicity and federal copyright law preemption analysis.
This Comment will explore the complicated relationship of state right
of publicity laws and the federal copyright preemption doctrine under the
Copyright Act of 1976.9 It will also critique the Eighth Circuit’s shallow
analysis of the preemption issue in Ray v. ESPN, Inc. and argue for a
modified version of Professor David Nimmer’s preemption framework10 in
an effort to address the inconsistency among the courts in resolving
copyright preemption disputes.11
Part II of this Comment will first document the background and
development of the right of publicity from its origins in the right to privacy
to its current framework, which incentivizes the development of
performances that appeal to the public by protecting the economic interests

6. See Ray v. ESPN, Inc., 783 F.3d 1140, 1144–45 (8th Cir. 2015).
7. Id. at 1141.
8. Rebecca Tushnet, 8th Circuit Dismisses Right of Publicity Claim as Copyright
Preempted,
REBECCA
TUSHNET’S
43(B)LOG
(Apr.
23,
2015,
3:45
PM),
http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2015/04/8th-circuit-dismisses-right-of.html [http://perma.cc/6DXFEEXR].
9. Riccard, supra note 4, at 430 (identifying the need for clarity in the copyrightpreemption debate).
10. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT VOLUME 1 §
1.01(B)(3)(b)(iv)(I)–(II) (2013); see also Bryant, supra note 3, at 18 (“Professor Nimmer
proposes a two-part test for analyzing cases where copyright, the right of publicity, and contract
law intersect.”).
11. See Riccard, supra note 4, at 442 (identifying opposing outcomes of cases within both
the Fifth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit).
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of individuals in their own identities.12 Part III will examine the current
challenges facing courts in interpreting, analyzing, and applying the
jurisdictional differences of state right of publicity laws as they vary from
region to region. Part IV of this Comment will describe the development
of current federal copyright law after the establishment of the Copyright
Act of 1976. Part V will examine the history and interaction of federal
copyright law with state right of publicity laws in federal courts. Lastly,
Part VI will describe Professor Nimmer’s current copyright preemption
framework along with its shortcomings and Part VII will propose a
modified version of this framework as a solution to the Eighth Circuit’s
shortcomings in Ray v. ESPN, Inc. Ultimately, this Comment will propose
the use of a modified version of Nimmer’s framework and test to help
resolve copyright preemption disputes.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
The right of publicity traces its origins to the right of privacy. 13 The
right of privacy was first postulated in the United States in Samuel D.
Warren and future United States Supreme Court Justice Louis D.
Brandeis’s 1890 Harvard Law Review article, The Right to Privacy, as the
“right to be let alone.”14 This right sought to protect the private affairs of
individuals from becoming open and public.15 It additionally sought to
protect all persons from unwarranted public disclosure of matters they
would prefer to keep private.16 However, Warren and Brandeis noted that
there were certain persons, namely political figures, who may have in
varying degrees renounced their right to live “screened from public
observation.”17
12. Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. MLB Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 678–79 (7th Cir. 1986)
(citing generally Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977)).
13. Alex J. Berger, Note, Righting the Wrong of Publicity: A Novel Proposal for a
Uniform Federal Right of Publicity Statute, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 845, 849 (2015); see also Justin B.
Bryant, Article, Applying the Lessons from Dryer v. NFL: Forming a Workable Framework for
Analyzing the Right of Publicity in Professional Sports, 22 SPORTS LAW. J. 1, 3 (2015).
14. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 197 (1890); see also Berger, supra note 13; Bryant, supra note 13.
15. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 14, at 214–15.
16. Id.; Berger, supra note 13.
17. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 14, at 215.
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In 1960, William Prosser laid the framework for what would become
the modern right of publicity in his article, Privacy.18 Prosser observed that
the law of privacy was comprised of four different types of tort invasions
that each fundamentally interfered with a person’s right “to be let alone.”19
These four tort invasions of privacy were: intrusion upon a person’s
privacy, public disclosure of “embarrassing private facts,” placing a person
in a false light in the public eye, and misappropriation of a person’s name
or likeness for the advantage of another.20 The modern right of publicity
derives from the fourth tort of misappropriation of a person’s name or
likeness for the advantage of another.21 In discussing the tort of
misappropriation of name or likeness, Prosser noted that at that point in
time, there were a large number of cases in many states where plaintiffs
were able to recover when other persons used their names or likenesses
without their consent for advertisements and other business purposes and
had benefitted from such use.22 However, certain states limited the scope
of their misappropriation statutes to unauthorized uses for advertising or
“purposes of trade” and were therefore narrower in scope than their
common law counterparts in other states.23 Notably, Prosser distinguished
the misappropriation of a person’s name or likeness for the advantage of
another from the other three tort invasions of privacy because the interest
protected was not a mental one, but an economic interest in the exclusive
use of a person’s name or likeness as an aspect of that person’s identity.24
Case law developed simultaneously, thereby laying the foundation for
modern judicial scrutiny and analysis of the right of publicity.25 In O’Brien
18. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960); see also Berger,
supra note 13; Bryant, supra note 13, at 3–4.
19. Prosser, supra note 18; see also Bryant, supra note 13.
20. Prosser, supra note 18; see also Bryant, supra note 13.
21. Bryant, supra note 13, at 4; see also Berger, supra note 13.
22. Prosser, supra note 18, at 401–02.
23. Id. at 402–03 (discussing the statute in New York and similar statutes modeled after
it).
24. Id. at 406; see also Bryant, supra note 13, at 4.
25. See O’Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 167 (5th Cir. 1941); see Bryant, supra
note 13, at 4–5 (“Also helping to pave the way for a judicially recognized right of publicity was
the case of O’Brien v. Pabst Sales Co.”).
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v. Pabst Sales Co., the former collegiate and professional football player,
Davey O’Brien, claimed that the defendant’s use of a picture of him in his
football uniform in a calendar was an invasion of his privacy rights.26 The
Fifth Circuit held in favor of the defendant, determining that the plaintiff
was a public figure, had posed for the original photo specifically intending
to receive publicity, and that the photo’s subsequent use in the calendar
with the permission of the photo’s owner did not create the impression that
the plaintiff endorsed or recommended the defendant’s beer.27
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit would
later coin the term “right of publicity” for the first time in Haelan
Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.28 There, plaintiff Haelan
Laboratories contracted with a baseball player for the exclusive right to use
his photograph for the purposes of selling gum for a stated term. 29 The
contract stipulated that the baseball player could not grant a similar right to
any other gum manufacturer during that term, and also provided Haelan
Laboratories the option to extend the exclusive use term for a designated
period.30 Aware of this contract, Topps Chewing Gum then induced the
same baseball player to enter into a similar contract.31 The Second Circuit
held in favor of the plaintiff, recognizing a right of publicity that was
separate and independent from the right of privacy.32 This separate right of
publicity was a pecuniary right based on the principle that a person could

26. O’Brien, 124 F.2d at 168; see Bryant, supra note 13, at 4–5 (discussing the facts and
holding of O’Brien v. Pabst Sales, Co.).
27. O’Brien, 124 F.2d at 170; see also Bryant, supra note 13, at 4–5 (discussing the facts
and holding of O’Brien v. Pabst Sales, Co.).
28. See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953)
(“This right might be called a ‘right of publicity.’”); Berger, supra note 13 (“The actual term
‘right of publicity’ first appeared in the case of Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing
Gum, Inc. in 1953.”); see also Bryant, supra note 13, at 5 (“Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc. was the first federal case to recognize a stand-alone right of publicity.”).
29. Haelan Labs., Inc., 202 F.2d at 867.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 868.
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detach and convey his or her likeness to another, similar to a property
right.33
It was not until 1977 in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.
that the United States Supreme Court weighed in on the issue of the right of
publicity.34 There, a television reporter attended a fair and recorded the
entire performance of a fair entertainer against the entertainer’s wishes and
despite the entertainer’s instruction to the reporter not to do so.35 That
recording was later broadcasted on the television station’s evening
program.36 Holding that the Constitution did not conflict with state right of
publicity laws,37 the Supreme Court noted that the purpose of the state right
of publicity was to protect the pecuniary and discretionary interests of
performers in their acts and analogized the right to the purposes of patent
and copyright law.38 Further focusing on the commercial aspect of the
right of publicity, the Supreme Court noted that much of the economic
value of a performance lay in the performer’s “right of exclusive control
over the publicity given to his performance.”39 The Supreme Court’s
rationale for protecting the state right of publicity also lay in preventing the
unauthorized use of a performer’s performance for the unjust enrichment of
another.40 Moreover, the Supreme Court noted that protecting performers’
33. Id. (“[A] man has . . . the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his
picture, and that such a grant may validly be made . . . without any accompanying transfer of a
business or of anything else.”); Bryant, supra note 13, at 5 (“The [Second Circuit] concluded that
individuals have a property right in their identities that is capable of being legally separated from
them.”).
34. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 562 (1977); see Berger, supra
note 13, at 850 (“The Supreme Court first considered the right of publicity in 1977, in Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Company.”); Bryant, supra note 13, at 5 (“The only United States
Supreme Court case to address the right of publicity was Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co.”).
35. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 563–64.
36. Id. at 564.
37. Id. at 577–79 (“The Constitution does not prevent Ohio from . . . deciding to protect
the entertainer’s incentive in order to encourage the production of this type of work.”).
38. Id. at 573.
39. Id. at 575 (“The rationale for protecting the right of publicity is the straight forward
one of preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of good will.”).
40. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576; Kristen E. Riccard, Comment, Product Placement or Pure
Entertainment? Critiquing a Copyright-Preemption Proposal, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 427, 437 (2009)
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state rights of publicity served the additional goal of providing economic
incentives for performers to continue to “make the investment required to
produce a performance of interest to the public” and likened the right to the
considerations behind federal patent and copyright laws.41
While
42
recognizing the validity of state right of publicity claims, the Supreme
Court in Zacchini ultimately failed to put forth any definitive standard or
test for courts to follow in conducting a right of publicity analysis.43
Instead, and perhaps tellingly, the Supreme Court reached its conclusion
simply by likening the underlying goal and policy of the state right of
publicity to federal patent and copyright law.44
III. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY TODAY
Today, the right of publicity has become widely recognized and
accepted, manifesting in over half of all states through enacted state
legislation, common law, or both.45 Functionally, the right of publicity
allows an individual the means to protect against the unauthorized
commercial use of his or her likeness or identity by another.46 Because the

(observing that the goal of the Supreme Court in protecting the right of publicity was to prevent a
person from benefiting from the unauthorized use of another’s identity).
41. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576; see also Berger, supra note 13, at 850 (“The Court held
that ‘the protection provides an economic incentive for [the performer] to make the investment
required to produce a performance of interest to the public.’”); Riccard, supra note 40, at 437–38
(“[T]he Court also noted other justifications for this state right, including the need to encourage
celebrities to invest time and money to make their performances interesting to the public.”).
42. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 577–79 (finding that neither the First nor the Fourteenth
Amendments barred states from protecting rights of publicity).
43. Bryant, supra note 13, at 5.
44. Id. at 5–6; see Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576 (“The economic philosophy behind the
clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement
of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents
of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”).
45. See Alex J. Berger, Note, Righting the Wrong of Publicity: A Novel Proposal for a
Uniform Federal Right of Publicity Statute, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 845, 851 (2015) (“[T]he right of
publicity has rapidly spread throughout the country, taking on various forms in state statutes and
case law. As of 2010, thirty-one states recognize the right of publicity—eleven exclusively
through statute, twelve through the common law, and eight through a combination of the two.”).
46. Justin B. Bryant, Article, Applying the Lessons from Dryer v. NFL: Forming a
Workable Framework for Analyzing the Right of Publicity in Professional Sports, 22 SPORTS
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right of publicity concerns an individual’s exclusive right to control the use
of his or her own likeness or identity for economic benefit, it is a separate
and distinct right from the right of privacy.47 It is perhaps most often
utilized by prominent public figures and celebrities in claims attempting to
prevent the use of their likeness or image for the purpose of
advertisements.48
However, the right of publicity’s origins independent development in
state common law, and the lack of a codified federal right of publicity
statute has resulted in right of publicity laws with elements that vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.49 Additional disagreement and inconsistency
between jurisdictions arises from conflicting statutory and common law
right of publicity laws, even within the same states.50 The differing right of
publicity laws creates unnecessary and burdensome issues in litigation for
both the courts and the litigating parties involved.51 This variance from
state to state leaves federal courts with the odious task of interpreting the
different jurisdictional right of publicity laws, “often in relation to a single
party in a single action.”52
The problems that arise from inconsistencies in the laws is
demonstrated in comparing courts’ application of right of publicity laws.
The Ninth Circuit has applied the common law right of publicity with a
wide brush to include works that merely “evoke” a celebrity’s persona
without the misuse of any tangible aspects of his or her identity.53 In
contrast, the Second Circuit’s analysis is based on the trademark regulating

LAW. J. 1, 3 (2015); Kristen E. Riccard, Comment, Product Placement or Pure Entertainment?
Critiquing a Copyright-Preemption Proposal, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 427, 436 (2009).
47. Riccard, supra note 46.
48. Id. at 437.
49. Bryant, supra note 46, at 6.
50. Berger, supra note 45, at 859–60.
51. Id. at 859 (“Because the right of publicity differs from state to state, federal courts are
commonly burdened with interpreting different state laws, often in relation to a single party in a
single action.”).
52. Id. (discussing the current state of the right of publicity).
53. Id. at 846–47 (referencing White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th
Cir. 1992)).
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Lanham Act,54 requiring the specific use of another’s likeness for the
endorsement of products to sustain a right of publicity claim.55
Still, state right of publicity claims are becoming more common in
courts.56 Right of publicity claims in professional and broadcast sports are
of specific relevance to this article.57 This is an especially problematic
issue given the seemingly unavoidable conflict between most state right of
publicity laws and federal copyright laws.58 The most common situation
for this conflict to occur is when a celebrity or athlete whose likeness or
image is attached to a copyrighted work wishes to prevent the copyright
owner from using the work in some unapproved manner.59 Thus, while
state right of publicity laws play an important role in enabling individuals
to protect their commercial and discretionary interests in their own likeness
and image, they often directly conflict with the federally-backed right of
copyright owners to exercise their exclusive rights to control their
copyrighted works.60
IV. FEDERAL COPYRIGHT LAW
The basis for copyright protection is stated in Article I, Section 8 of
the United States Constitution: “[t]o promote the progress of science and
useful arts, by securing, for limited times to authors and inventors, the

54. Id. at 847 (referring to New York state courts and Groden v. Random House, Inc., 61
F.3d 1045, 1049 (2d Cir. 1995)). See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012).
55. Berger, supra note 45, at 847 (“[C]ommonly reject claims in which the defendant has
not used the celebrity’s likeness to endorse a specific product and sustain claims where the
defendant used the likeness for ‘blatant selfish commercial exploitation.’”).
56. See Riccard, supra note 46, at 438 (“Courts’ willingness to uphold a right of publicity
claim is on the rise.”).
57. E.g., Ray v. ESPN, Inc., 783 F.3d 1140 (8th Cir. 2015); Dryer v. NFL, 55 F. Supp. 3d
1181 (D. Minn. 2014); Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. MLB Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986);
see also Bryant, supra note 46, at 6 (discussing the right of publicity challenges that have arisen
in the arena of fantasy sports and professional baseball).
58. Berger, supra note 45, at 847 (“This uncertainty is further complicated because most
statutory and common law right of publicity laws conflict with existing copyright law.”).
59. Riccard, supra note 46, at 439.
60. Id. at 439–40.
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exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”61 This Section
of the Constitution, known as the Copyright and Patent Clause, reflects the
drafters’ understanding of the need to incentivize the investment of time
and effort in creating “science and useful arts.”62 However, this policy of
incentives was not the main reason for establishing copyright protection.63
The underlying rationale was that by incentivizing people to create new
works of art and science, they would directly advance and improve public
welfare through their innovative contributions to society.64 This underlying
rationale remains the driving logic in modern federal statutory copyright
law by way of continuing the policy of economically incentivizing
creations and copyright ownership.65
The Federal Copyright Act of 1976 (“Copyright Act”) is codified in
17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1331.66 At the fundamental level, the Copyright Act
protects the property interests of copyright holders in retaining ownership

61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Joseph P. Bauer, Addressing the Incoherency of
the Preemption Provision of the Copyright Act of 1976, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 11
(2007).
62. See Bauer, supra note 61 (“[A]ccording certain exclusive rights to authors . . . is a
necessary and appropriate incentive to, and reward for, the creation of literary and artistic
works.”); see also Kristen E. Riccard, Comment, Product Placement or Pure Entertainment?
Critiquing a Copyright-Preemption Proposal, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 427, 432 (2009) (“However,
Congress recognized the need to provide some reward to creators, authors, and producers in
exchange for their investment in order to encourage individuals to spend time and money
producing original works for public access.”).
63. See Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (“The primary
objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but ‘[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts.’”).
64. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) (“The
economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyright is
the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance
public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’
Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the
services rendered.”) (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)); see also Bauer, supra
note 61 (“However, it is important to bear in mind that the real beneficiary of copyright protection
is the public, because the quality and quantity of society’s cultural resources are increased.”).
65. See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576 (“This same consideration underlies the patent and
copyright laws long enforced by this Court.”).
66. See generally Copyrights, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2012).
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of qualifying works.67 The origins of this protected interest trace back to
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, as it is based on the same kind of
incentives first put forth in the Copyright and Patent Clause.68 The
Copyright Act establishes the parameters of what the subject matter of
copyright encompasses69 and outlines the exclusive rights that copyright
owners have in their property.70 The incentives inherent in the protection
of these rights allow copyright owners the freedom to capitalize on their
ownership interests, thereby giving economic value to their rights as
copyright holders.71 This is consistent with the framework put forth by the
founders in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.72 However, these
underlying copyright principles, as the Supreme Court noted in Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., are similar to and often overlap with
the underlying principles of the right of publicity.73
When Congress enacted the Copyright Act, it replaced the dual state
and federal copyright system under the Copyright Act of 1909 with a single
unified federal copyright law framework.74 Under the prior Copyright Act
of 1909, both state and federal copyright protection existed
simultaneously.75 However, the protection was layered with federal
copyright law, requiring works to be published before qualifying for federal
copyright protection.76 Without publication, a work could only be
67. See Bauer, supra note 61, at 11–12 (characterizing the qualifying works as
“intellectual property”).
68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Bauer, supra note 61.
69. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 102–103 (outlining the eight categories of original works
of authorship, as well as compilations and derivative works).
70. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 106 (granting copyright owners exclusive rights).
71. See Riccard, supra note 62, at 433 (“This control creates a system of economic
rewards for copyright owners because they can charge others for access to, and use of, the
work.”).
72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Bauer, supra note 61.
73. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977).
74. See generally Bauer, supra note 61.
75. Id. at 6.
76. Id.
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protected under state copyright common law.77
Furthering the
inconsistencies, once a work achieved publication and obtained federal
copyright protection, that federal protection required renewal after a term
of years with an eventual expiration date, thereby returning the work to the
public domain.78 By contrast, common law copyright protection of
unpublished works had no such expiration date, meaning an author or
creator could, in effect, achieve eternal copyright protection by simply not
publishing his or her work.79
With the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976, which included the
preemption doctrine provided by section 301,80 the dual state and federal
system of copyright protection was replaced and copyright law was unified
under the new federal statute.81 To achieve this uniformity, the drafters
included section 301, which expressly preempted all prior existing state
copyright laws, consequently establishing the Copyright Act as the sole
controlling law.82 However, the language of section 301 extends not just to
the preemption of prior state copyright laws, but all state law rights that are
found to be equivalent to any of the rights codified under the new
Copyright Act.83 This express preemption of other incompatible state law
rights beyond common law copyright was the result of the drafters’ attempt
to construct a copyright law framework that provided for the protection of

77. See id.
78. Id. at 7 (Following the initial 28 year term, works could be renewed for an additional
28 years after which federal copyright protection expired.).
79. Bauer, supra note 61, at 7.
80. Id. at 7–8.
81. Id. at 23–27 (discussing the alternative state and federal copyright system under the
Copyright Act of 1909 and the benefits of a single federal regime).
82. Id. at 7–8; see generally 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2012) (“On and after January 1, 1978, all
legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope
of copyright as specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible
medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections
102 and 103, whether created before or after that date and whether published or unpublished, are
governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent
right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any State.”).
83. Bauer, supra note 61, at 7–8 (discussing that the extension of the preemption
provision reaches even additional state rights).

HWANG_ARTICLE_DP_FINAL_EDIT (DO NOT DELETE)

220

4/27/2017 9:28 AM

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:2

certain works.84 This reflected the drafters’ concerted effort to move
forward in favor of a unified, single federal system.85
The drafters offered four main arguments for favoring a single federal
system: (1) the importance of national uniformity and avoiding the
“practical difficulties” of having to navigate under differing laws and “in
the separate courts of the various States”; (2) the increasing obsolescence
of publications in the developing digital world; (3) the implementation of
the “limited times” provision of the Constitution; and (4) the “[a]doption of
a uniform national [standard] would greatly improve international dealings
in copyrighted materials.”86 While the enactment of the Copyright Act may
have achieved the drafters’ broader goal of discarding state common law
copyright law and establishing a uniform federal copyright law system,
section 301 has failed to achieve that goal in the context of preemption and
state law right of publicity claims.87
V. STATE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY CLAIMS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
FEDERAL COPYRIGHT ACT PREEMPTION ANALYSIS
According to its drafters, the goal of section 301 of the Copyright Act
was to achieve uniformity by federalizing copyright law and affording
consistent interpretation of the preemption provisions.88 The drafters’
assertions that section 301 would achieve uniformity and consistency has
proven to be incorrect.89 Since its enactment, scholars have noted that the
volume of cases in which both federal and state courts have had to interpret
the statutory provision, coupled with the high number of appellate
decisions that have overruled lower courts, is a clear indication that neither

84. Id. at 8.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 8–9 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 129–30 (1976)).
87. See Riccard, supra note 62, at 429–30; see also Bauer, supra note 61, at 3–4 (“The
uncertainty about the scope of preemption is highlighted . . . by the fact that, in particular, the
appellate decisions have not infrequently overruled the trial court’s conclusion on preemption,
and/or have contained concurring and dissenting opinions on this supposedly ‘clear’ issue.”).
88. Joseph P. Bauer, Addressing the Incoherency of the Preemption Provision of the
Copyright Act of 1976, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 7–9 (2007) (discussing the legislative
history of section 301 of 1979).
89. Id. at 3 (discussing the legislative history of section 301).
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uniformity nor consistent interpretation has been achieved.90 This
Comment, however, will narrow the focus of its analysis to copyright
preemption and state law right of publicity claims as they are relevant to
the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Ray v. ESPN, Inc.
Administratively, the current state of confusion and inconsistency in
court analysis of state law right of publicity claims91 reflects the difficulties
that the drafters of section 301 hoped to remove by creating a uniform
federalized system.92 Indeed, the first of the four offered arguments put
forth by the drafters for the development of section 301 was “promot[ing]
national uniformity and . . . avoid[ing] the difficulties of determining and
enforcing an author’s rights under the differing laws and in the separate
courts of the various States.”93 The inconsistency between common law
and statutory right of publicity laws presents a major obstacle for courts
and parties trying to interpret different jurisdictional laws independent of
the additional issue of copyright preemption under section 301(a) of the
Copyright Act.94
Statutory preemption analysis begins with section 301(a) of the
Copyright Act, which contains the two requirements that must be met for
preemption of a state law claim.95 The first prong of section 301(a)
requires that the work at issue be “fixed in a tangible medium of
expression” and fall within the subject matter or scope of copyright

90. Id. at 3–4.
91. Alex J. Berger, Note, Righting the Wrong of Publicity: A Novel Proposal for a
Uniform Federal Right of Publicity Statute, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 845, 859–60 (2015) (discussing the
litany of issues facing both courts and would-be litigants, and the confusion and inconsistency
stemming from conflicting statutory and common law rights of publicity).
92. See Bauer, supra note 88, at 8–9 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 130 (1976)).
93. Id. at 8 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 130 (1976)).
94. See Berger, supra note 91, at 860.
95. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2012) (“On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable
rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as
specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression
and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, whether
created before or after that date and whether published or unpublished, are governed exclusively
by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such
work under the common law or statutes of any State.”).
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protection.96 The second prong of section 301(a) requires that the state law
right barred be “equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general
scope of copyright as specified in § 106 [of the Copyright Act].”97 Section
301 then lists limitations to its own reach and identifies the types of claims
outside of its preemptive powers.98 Prior to the enactment of the current
provision, an earlier draft of section 301 explicitly listed various state laws
and rights that would not be preempted by the Copyright Act.99 The
unfortunate removal of this list prior to enactment has been a source of
additional confusion in the preemption and right of publicity discourse as
courts have tried to glean Congress’s intentions for removing it as
guidance, inevitably resulting in inconsistent applications.100
A. Federal Copyright Equivalency and Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major
League Baseball Players Ass’n
Congress has failed to issue any clear guidance on when federal
copyright preemption of state claims should or should not occur and the
Supreme Court has remained silent on the matter, effectively guaranteeing
inconsistent treatment and analysis.101 As a result, the intersection of
federal copyright preemption and state law right of publicity claims has

96. Id.; see also Ray v. ESPN, Inc., 783 F.3d 1140, 1142 (8th Cir. 2015) (“(1) [T]he work
at issue is within the subject matter of copyright as defined in §§ 102 and 103 of the Copyright
Act . . . .”) (citing Nat’l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 428
(8th Cir. 1993)); Bauer, supra note 88, at 16 (deconstructing the prong into two separate
elements).
97. See Ray, 783 F.3d at 1143 (“(2) [T]he state law created right is equivalent to any of
the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified in § 106.”) (citing Nat’l Car
Rental Sys., Inc. v. Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 428 (8th Cir. 1993)); Bauer, supra
note 88, at 16 (further deconstructing the prong into two separate elements).
98. 17 U.S.C. § 301.
99. Kristen E. Riccard, Comment, Product Placement or Pure Entertainment? Critiquing
a Copyright-Preemption Proposal, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 427, 441 (2009) (referencing H.R. REP.
NO. 94-1476, at 24 (1976)).
100. Id. at 441–42 (referencing Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright Preemption and the Right
of Publicity, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 199, 234–35 (2002)).
101. See Bauer, supra note 88, at 5 (“These considerations, coupled with the significant
divergence of results that one would expect from courts in fifty different jurisdictions and the
lamentable fact that the Supreme Court has never heard a case under § 301, either from a state or
a federal court, only contribute to the problem.”); Riccard, supra note 99, at 442–43.
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been a particularly challenging issue for courts.102 The Seventh Circuit’s
opinion in Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n
has emerged as an important and controversial decision over the years.103
There, three professional baseball players filed suit against the Baltimore
Orioles, asserting that television broadcasts of games violated their rights
of publicity.104 This action followed a long-standing disagreement between
the Major League Baseball Players Association and the Major League
Baseball Clubs regarding the ownership of broadcast rights of the baseball
players’ performances during games.105 In its opinion, the Seventh Circuit
determined that section 301(a) of the Copyright Act preempted the state
law right of publicity claims raised by the players.106 The court concluded
that because the players’ performances were recorded during the telecasts,
their performances were fixed in a tangible form of a copyrightable work,
thereby satisfying the first prong of the preemption test.107 As to the
second prong, the court found that the players’ asserted rights of publicity
were equivalent to the right to “perform” an audiovisual work, which falls
within the scope of copyright.108 The court went on to determine that the
underlying purposes of both federal copyright protection and the right of
publicity were the same—to promote works that benefit the public by
providing incentives.109 Scholars have noted the Seventh Circuit’s
problematic interpretation of finding preemption equivalence from the
similar purposes of both federal and state laws rather than establishing that
102. See Bauer, supra note 88, at 71 (“Courts have had substantial difficulty wrestling
with the proper scope of the preemption of a state right of publicity claim.”).
103. Id.; see Robert J. Bernstein & Robert W. Clarida, Copyright Law; Does Copyright
Preempt the Right of Publicity?, N.Y. L.J. (ONLINE), Mar. 18, 2005, LEXIS; Schuyler Moore,
Keeping Copyright Preemption on Track, L.J. NEWSLETTERS (Entm’t Law & Fin. Newsletter),
Aug. 1, 2012, at 5.
104. Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. MLB Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 666 (7th Cir. 1986).
105. Id. at 665.
106. Id. at 674.
107. Id. at 674–75.
108. Id. at 677.
109. Balt. Orioles, Inc., 805 F.2d at 679 (dismissing the players’ argument that the right
of publicity is not equivalent to the rights in section 106 because the right of publicity and
copyrights serve different interests); see also Bauer, supra note 88, at 72.
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the underlying goals of the laws are not required elements necessary to
establish equivalence under section 301.110 Despite this confusing
application, Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players
Ass’n has served as an important yet controversial precedent in determining
that many right of publicity claims should be preempted under section 301
because they are sufficiently equivalent to one of the rights of copyright
holders as listed in section 106.111
B. Influence of Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players
Ass’n on Ray v. ESPN, Inc.
The Eighth Circuit’s opinion in Ray v. ESPN, Inc. alluded to the
holding in Baltimore Orioles, Inc.112 In Ray, the plaintiff cited to the Fifth
Circuit case of Brown v. Ames in support of his argument that the true
“focal point” of his claim was not the re-broadcast of the video recordings,
but rather ESPN’s alleged use of his “likeness;” therefore his claim was not
within the subject matter reach of the Copyright Act,113 a requirement for
preemption under the first prong of section 301.114 The Eighth Circuit
rejected the plaintiff’s comparison to Brown on the grounds that the Brown
defendants were distinguishable because they used plaintiffs’ likenesses
and names of the plaintiffs to sell CD’s, cassettes, and other music
paraphernalia, despite not having received permission from the plaintiffs or
possessed valid copyrights.115 The Eighth Circuit further commented:
Notably, the court in Brown specifically distinguished Baltimore
Orioles—and in so doing, distinguished this case as well—on the grounds
that ‘the right of publicity claimed’ by the plaintiffs in Baltimore Orioles

110. Bauer, supra note 88, at 71–72.
111. Id. at 72; see Balt. Orioles, Inc., 805 F.2d at 677; see also Bernstein & Clarida,
supra note 103; Moore, supra note 103.
112. See Ray v. ESPN, Inc., 783 F.3d 1140, 1143 (8th Cir. 2015) (opining that the Fifth
Circuit in Brown v. Ames, 201 F.3d 654 (5th Cir. 2000) distinguished Brown from Baltimore
Orioles, Inc. and therefore Ray as well).
113. Id.
114. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2012).
115. Ray, 783 F.3d at 1143; see Brown, 201 F.3d at 656–57.
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‘was essentially a right to prevent rebroadcast of games whose broadcast
rights were already owned by’ other parties.116
In finding the Brown case factually distinguishable, the Eighth Circuit
properly drew parallels between the facts in Baltimore Orioles and the facts
in Ray v. ESPN, Inc. and effectively adopted the Seventh Circuit’s
reasoning from Baltimore Orioles.117 Like Baltimore Orioles, Ray
involved a professional athlete that contracted with a governing sports
institution to perform in filmed and televised sports matches for pecuniary
gain.118 However, the Eighth Circuit in Ray failed to address the Brown
court’s concern about the precedent set in Baltimore Orioles: “Baltimore
Orioles . . . has been heavily criticized for holding that a baseball game is a
protectable work of authorship simply because the performance was
recorded on videotape that was itself copyrightable.”119
The Fifth Circuit in Brown ultimately declined to find an individual’s
likeness copyrightable “simply because it was embodied in a copyrighted
work.”120 By contrast, the Eighth Circuit in Ray concluded that the use of
an individual’s likeness is indeed copyrightable if used with that
individual’s permission for economic or commercial purpose or if that
likeness is not detachable from the copyrighted performance contained in a
work.121 Mirroring the reasoning in Baltimore Orioles, the Eighth Circuit
found that individual performances are copyrightable so long as they are
fixed in tangible form.122 However, despite the correct outcome, the
116. Ray, 783 F.3d at 1143.
117. See id.
118. Id. at 1141; see also Ray v. ESPN, Inc., No. 13-1179-CV-W-SOW, 2014 WL
2766187, at *1–2 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 8, 2014).
119. Brown, 201 F.3d at 659.
120. Id.; see also Bernstein & Clarida, supra note 103 (“We decline appellants’ invitation
to find name or likeness copyrightable simply because they are placed on CD’s and tapes or in
catalogs that have copyrightable subject matter recorded on them.”).
121. See Ray, 783 F.3d at 1144 (“ESPN did not use Ray’s likeness or name in an
advertisement without his permission to promote its commercial products, and, as the district
court correctly noted, Ray’s ‘likeness could not be detached from the copyrighted performances
that were contained in the film.’”).
122. Id. (accepting the District Court’s analysis); see Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. MLB Ass’n,
805 F.2d 663, 674–75 (concluding that once a performance is recorded, it becomes fixed in
tangible form and thus is subject to federal copyright preemption).
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problem in the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning lies in the distinction between the
use of the work for commercial versus non-commercial purposes.123 This
distinction is problematic because, as the Supreme Court noted, the
economic incentives from which both copyright law and the right of
publicity derive are similar.124 As will later be explored, the inclusion of
this “commercial purpose” element is flawed because its addition does not
necessitate removing equivalency from the state right in question and rights
protected by the Copyright Act.125 If those rights are still equivalent, then
statutory preemption of the state right under federal copyright law must
occur.126
Additionally, the Eighth Circuit overlooked an important fact in Ray
and subsequently missed an opportunity to explore and develop a question
that was left open by Baltimore Orioles: signed express waivers of athletes’
rights of publicity.127 The Eighth Circuit and the district court both noted
that when the plaintiff in Ray contracted to perform recorded and televised
wrestling matches, he did so with the express knowledge and understanding
that the matches would be filmed and sold for future use to “generate
revenue.”128 The Eighth Circuit mentioned the issue of permission, but

123. See Ray, 783 F.3d at 1144 (“ESPN did not use Ray’s likeness or name in an
advertisement without his permission to promote its commercial products, and, as the district
court correctly noted, Ray’s ‘likeness could not be detached from the copyrighted performances
that were contained in the film.’”).
124. See generally Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (opining
that the protection of performers’ rights of publicity provides economic incentive for performers
to continue to make the investments required to produce performances of interest to the public,
the same consideration that underlies patent and copyright laws).
125. See Bauer, supra note 88, at 74–75 (reasoning that in a right of publicity action, the
added element of commercial purpose does not necessarily “give rise to a claim that is not
‘equivalent’ to the rights conferred on the copyright owner[s] by § 106.”).
126. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2012).
127. See Balt. Orioles, Inc., 805 F.2d at 674 (“[T]he Players claim that broadcasts of these
games made without their express consent violate their rights to publicity in their performances.”)
(emphasis added); see also Robert E. Freeman & Erica H. Esposito, An Update on Athlete
Publicity Rights in Sports Broadcasts, LAW360 (July 27, 2015, 2:11 PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/678990/an-update-on-athlete-publicity-rights-in-sportsbroadcasts [http://perma.cc/VN2T-H6BH] (“As similar cases unfold it will be interesting to see
what effect, if any, signed releases of the athlete’s right of publicity have on the courts’ decisions
and their copyright preemption analyses.”).
128. Ray, 783 F.3d at 1141 (“Ray specifically agreed with a representative of the UWF
that the films would be ‘sold and used.’”); see Ray v. ESPN, Inc., No. 13-1179-CV-W-SOW,
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only as it relates to the additional commercial element.129 Additionally, the
court cited to the leading copyright treatise, Nimmer on Copyright, to
discuss the implied waiver framework.130 However, by not further
exploring the significance and impact of an expressly signed waiver of the
right of publicity, the Eighth Circuit missed an opportunity to further refine
the analytical framework of how courts approach a state right of publicity
law and federal copyright preemption issue, particularly in the arena of
professional sports where such express signed waivers are common.131
C. Meaningful Additional Elements and Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch
Courts have found some small measure of agreement in their findings
that federal copyright should not preempt state law right of publicity claims
in cases involving the use of an individual’s likeness without permission in
advertisements for commercial gain.132 Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch
illustrates this situation.133 There, the work in question was a photograph
containing an image of the plaintiffs at a surf competition in 1965.134
Abercrombie purchased the photograph directly from the photographer and
then published the photograph in its catalog as part of a broad, surf-themed

2014 WL 2766187, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 8, 2014) (“[Ray] entered into a series of contracts . . .
and each match was filmed for future use in order to generate revenue.”).
129. Ray, 783 F.3d at 1144.
130. Id. (explaining in a parenthetical that when a performer collaborates in creating a
copyrighted work, he or she may not then try to use the right of publicity to prevent the use of the
copyrighted work for its intended purpose).
131. See id.
132. See Bauer, supra note 88, at 72 (“A comparably straightforward situation for finding
that a right of publicity claim was not preempted is presented by a case like Downing v.
Abercrombie & Fitch.”). See generally Toney v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 406 F.3d 905 (7th Cir.
2005) (involving the continued use of a model’s photograph and likeness to sell hair care
products after the initial license expired); Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994 (9th
Cir. 2001) (involving the use of a copyrighted photograph containing the plaintiffs without their
consent in a broad advertising campaign); Brown v. Ames, 201 F.3d 654 (5th Cir. 2000)
(involving the use of the plaintiffs’ names and likenesses to sell music records and paraphernalia).
133. See Bauer, supra note 88, at 72 (“A comparably straightforward situation for finding
that a right of publicity claim was not preempted is presented by a case like Downing v.
Abercrombie & Fitch.”).
134. Downing, 265 F.3d at 999–1000.

HWANG_ARTICLE_DP_FINAL_EDIT (DO NOT DELETE)

228

4/27/2017 9:28 AM

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:2

advertising campaign without obtaining plaintiffs’ permission.135 Along
with publishing the photo and identifying the plaintiffs by name,
Abercrombie also offered the same tee shirts worn by the plaintiffs in the
photo for sale in its catalog.136 The Ninth Circuit correctly determined that
although the photograph itself qualified as a work protected under section
103 of the Copyright Act, the fundamental issue and the basis of the
plaintiffs’ claims was the unauthorized “use of the [plaintiffs’] likenesses
and their names pictured in the published photograph.”137 Reversing in
favor of the plaintiffs, the Ninth Circuit held that “[a] person’s name or
likeness is not a work of authorship within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. §
102” and therefore, section 301 of the Copyright Act did not preempt the
plaintiffs’ claims based on the state right of publicity.138
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion addressed in its preemption analysis
additional meaningful elements derived from the plaintiffs’ state common
law and state statutory law claims.139 These additional elements require
that the defendant’s actions from which the plaintiffs’ claims arose be “for
commercial purposes and without the plaintiffs’ permission.”140 However,
the important distinction is the meaningful additional nature of these
elements and not their commercial purpose use per se.141 Known as the
“extra element” test, plaintiffs’ claims are removed from the general scope
of copyright and thus preemption if the meaningful additional elements
“change[] the nature of [state] claims so that it is qualitatively different
from copyright infringement claims.”142 In Downing, the Ninth Circuit
135. Id. at 1000.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1003; see also Bauer, supra note 88, at 72–73 (“[A]lthough the plaintiffs’
personas were embodied in the copyrightable photographs, the subject matter of their claims was
the unauthorized use of their names and likenesses.”).
138. Downing, 265 F.3d at 1004–05, 1010.
139. Bauer, supra note 88, at 73 (“Furthermore, the action for the defendant’s use of
[plaintiffs’] personas, which required evidence that the defendant’s actions were undertaken for
commercial purposes and without the plaintiffs’ permission, alleged meaningful additional
elements.”); see Downing, 265 F.3d at 1001 (describing the California common law and statutory
causes of action for commercial misappropriation).
140. Bauer, supra note 88, at 73.
141. Id. at 38–39 (describing the “extra element” test many courts have utilized).
142. See id. (describing the “extra element” test many courts have utilized).
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correctly identified that these meaningful additional elements removed the
plaintiffs’ claims from the subject matter of copyright because the subject
matter of the plaintiffs’ claims was the use of the plaintiffs’ names and
likenesses, which are not copyrightable.143
D. Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch and Ray v. ESPN, Inc.
The Eighth Circuit also distinguished Ray from Downing by
emphasizing the additional element alluded to by the Ninth Circuit
requiring evidence of the commercial purpose of a defendant’s actions.144
However, by simply stating whether or not the commercial purpose
element was met, the Eighth Circuit essentially asserted the inconsistent
conclusion that use of a copyrighted work in an advertisement for
commercially economic purposes constitutes use of a likeness whereas the
use of the exact same work in a mere rebroadcast, as in Baltimore Orioles,
does not.145 Regardless, the end result of preemption that the court reached
was the correct outcome,146 as the Eighth Circuit determined that Ray’s
likeness could not be detached from the copyrighted performances
contained in the video recordings.147 Additionally, in concluding that
ESPN did not use Ray’s likeness without his permission to serve that
commercial economic purpose, the Eighth Circuit properly determined that
Ray’s right of publicity claim was preempted.148 Despite reaching the
correct result, the Eighth Circuit’s hasty opinion again brushed past an
143. See Downing, 265 F.3d at 1005 (“[T]he subject matter of the [plaintiffs’] statutory
and common law right of publicity claims is their names and likenesses, which are not
copyrightable.”).
144. See Ray v. ESPN, Inc., 783 F.3d 1140, 1144 (8th Cir. 2015) (“ESPN did not use
Ray’s likeness or name in an advertisement without his permission to promote its commercial
products . . . .”).
145. Rebecca Tushnet, 8th Circuit Dismisses Right of Publicity Claim as Copyright
Preempted,
REBECCA
TUSHNET’S
43(B)LOG
(Apr.
23,
2015,
3:45
PM),
http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2015/04/8th-circuit-dismisses-right-of.html [http://perma.cc/6DXFEEXR].
146. Id.
147. Ray, 783 F.3d at 1144 (quoting the District Court’s finding that once performances
are captured on film with the consent of the performer, they are a part of the copyrighted material
and the performer’s likeness can no longer be detached from the copyrighted performances
contained in the recording).
148. Id. at 1144–45 (quoting the District Court).
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analysis of express waiver of the right of publicity and instead simply
relied on Nimmer on Copyright and its argument of an implied waiver of an
individual’s right to publicity by that individual’s collaboration in creating
the copyrighted work.149
E. Proof of Additional Elements and Wendt v. Host International, Inc.
The inclusion in preemption analysis of additional elements like those
alluded to by the Ninth Circuit in Downing has not been without
controversy.150 Wendt v. Host International, Inc., another Ninth Circuit
decision, has been the subject of much scrutiny and criticism by courts and
scholars alike.151 There, the plaintiffs were two actors from the television
show “Cheers.”152 The defendant sought to open several “Cheers” themed
airport bars and, after acquiring the licenses from the owners of the
copyright in the show, created and placed in the bars animatronic figures
based on the characters played by the plaintiffs.153 The Ninth Circuit
erroneously held that the plaintiffs’ right of publicity claims were not
preempted by federal copyright law because those claims required
satisfaction of additional elements different from those required of a
copyright claim.154 In so doing, the Ninth Circuit determined that if a right

149. Id. at 1144 (explaining in a parenthetical that Nimmer’s argument that performers
that collaborate in creating copyrighted works are barred from making right of publicity claims to
prevent the use of that copyrighted work for its intended purpose).
150. Bauer, supra note 88, at 73 (“Far more problematic in its treatment of the
preemption of the right of publicity is another Ninth Circuit decision, Wendt v. Host
International, Inc., which is among the most frequently-discussed and heavily-criticized decisions
dealing with this question.”).
151. Id. (“Wendt v. Host International, Inc. . . . is among the most frequently-discussed
and heavily-criticized decisions dealing with [preemption of the right of publicity].”).
152. Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 809 (9th Cir. 1997).
153. Bauer, supra note 88, at 73 (providing the factual background of the case).
154. See Wendt, 125 F.3d at 810 (explaining its previous holding in Wendt that plaintiffs’
state law claims “are not preempted by the federal copyright statute so long as they ‘contain
elements, such as the invasion of personal rights . . . that are different in kind from copyright
infringement.’”); see also Bauer, supra note 88, at 74 (“[Plaintiffs’] claims were not preempted
because they required proof of additional elements beyond those needed to make out a copyright
claim—specifically, ‘proof that the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s ‘likeness’ or ‘identity’ was
commercial . . . whereas copyright infringement occurs with any unauthorized copying of the
protected material.’”).
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of publicity claim contains any of these additional elements, it does not fall
under the section 301 preemption provision of the Copyright Act.155 This
rationale is problematic because the addition of an extra element by itself
does not necessarily dictate that the claim then ceases to be equivalent to
one of the rights protected under section 106 of the Copyright Act.156
Indeed, as the Seventh Circuit mistakenly asserted in Baltimore
Orioles, if equivalency between the right of publicity and rights protected
under federal copyright law is established because of their analogous
underlying interests in promoting works for the benefit of the public,157
then the mere addition of a commercial use requirement would not destroy
this equivalency.158 The Eighth Circuit in Ray v. ESPN, Inc. mirrored this
flawed reasoning by restricting the focus of its analysis simply to whether
ESPN used Ray’s likeness for a commercial purpose without his
permission rather than explore whether this commercial purpose gave rise
to a state right of publicity claim fundamentally different from a copyright
infringement claim.159
VI. SHORTFALLS OF NIMMER’S PREEMPTION FRAMEWORK
In the leading copyright treatise Nimmer on Copyright, Professor
David Nimmer sets forth a framework that utilizes a two-part test for courts
to use in analyzing the intersection of federal copyright law, state law right
of publicity, and contract law.160 Nimmer proposed the test after surveying
relevant case law and comparing the differing decisions reached by courts
155. See Wendt, 125 F.3d at 810.
156. See Bauer, supra note 88, at 75 (“[T]hat added ‘fact’ or ‘element’ in a right of
publicity action does not, by itself, properly give rise to a claim that is not ‘equivalent to’ the
rights conferred on the copyright owner by § 106.”).
157. Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. MLB Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 678–79 (7th Cir. 1986).
158. See Bauer, supra note 88, at 75 (“[T]hat added ‘fact’ or ‘element’ in a right of
publicity action does not, by itself, properly give rise to a claim that is not ‘equivalent to’ the
rights conferred on the copyright owner by § 106.”).
159. See Ray v. ESPN, Inc., 783 F.3d 1140, 1144 (8th Cir. 2015).
160. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT VOLUME 1
§ 1.01(B)(3)(b)(iv)(I)–(II) (2013); see also Justin B. Bryant, Article, Applying the Lessons from
Dryer v. NFL: Forming a Workable Framework for Analyzing the Right of Publicity in
Professional Sports, 22 SPORTS LAW. J. 1, 18 (2015) (“Professor Nimmer proposes a two-part
test for analyzing cases where copyright, the right of publicity, and contract law intersect.”).
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in analyzing federal copyright preemption of state law right of publicity
cases.161 This two-step process was developed from the patterns that
emerged, highlighting the divergence of court decisions based on the
determining factor of whether the works in question were used for
commercial advertisement purposes or for entertainment purposes.162
Under Nimmer’s test, courts would first determine how the
copyrighted work in question is being used—specifically, whether for
commercial advertisement purposes or for entertainment purposes.163
Nimmer warns courts against categorizing the works by type or medium, as
no single type of work always falls into the same category of commercial
advertisement or entertainment.164 Nimmer found that when copyrighted
works are used “‘for the purposes of trade,’ such as in an advertisement,
plaintiffs’ right-of-publicity claims have not been held to be preempted.”165
Rather, expressive uses of copyrighted works are likely to preempt state
right of publicity claims.166 The Third Circuit in Facenda v. NFL Films,
Inc. opined that this is because the regulation of trade practices falls under
the authority of state law while limiting the use of expressive works crosses
into the subject matter of federal copyright law.167
If the court finds that a copyrighted work was used for commercial
advertisement purposes, it should then proceed to Nimmer’s second prong
of the test and examine the terms of the contract to determine the “purpose
of the use” of the work to which the plaintiff consented when they initially
signed the contract.168 Nimmer emphasizes that courts should focus on
whether the plaintiff “collaborated in the creation of a copyrighted
161. Kristen E. Riccard, Comment, Product Placement or Pure Entertainment?
Critiquing a Copyright-Preemption Proposal, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 427, 444–45 (2009); see
Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1029 (3d Cir. 2008). See generally NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 160.
162. Riccard, supra note 161, at 444–45; see NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 160.
163. Riccard, supra note 161, at 444; see NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 160.
164. Riccard, supra note 161, at 445; see NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 160.
165. Facenda, 542 F.3d at 1029.
166. Riccard, supra note 161, at 445; see NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 160.
167. Facenda, 542 F.3d at 1029.
168. Riccard, supra note 161, at 446; see NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 160.
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advertising product.”169 If the original work that the plaintiff consented to
was a commercial advertisement, courts have found that the plaintiff gave
his or her implied permission to the copyright owner to create derivative
works for commercial purposes.170
Within this framework, Nimmer properly advocates for the
establishment of a waiver analysis in the second prong of his test by
proposing that courts examine whether the plaintiff in a preemption case
essentially waived his or her rights of publicity by collaborating to create a
copyrighted advertising work or by implicitly giving their consent to the
copyright owner by agreeing to participate in a copyrighted work that he or
she knows will be used for commercial advertisement purposes.171
However, the problem lies with Nimmer’s first prong and its focus on the
commercially economic or expressive use of the copyrighted work.172 As
noted earlier, the use of a copyrighted work for commercially economic
purposes does not in itself assert a right that is not equivalent to a right
protected under federal copyright statute.173 Therefore, while Nimmer’s
framework is successful in harmonizing how various courts have reached
their outcomes in federal copyright preemption of state right of publicity
issues in the past,174 it is not helpful in analyzing potential future
preemption cases.
VII. RAY V. ESPN, INC. AND A MODIFIED SOLUTION
A proper framework for federal copyright preemption of state right of
publicity issues should facilitate predictions of how a court will determine a

169. Bryant, supra note 160; see NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 160.
170. Riccard, supra note 161, at 446; see NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 160.
171. See Ray v. ESPN, Inc., No. 13-1179-CV-W-SOW, 2014 WL 2766187, at *5 (W.D.
Mo. Apr. 8, 2014) (“When a performer gives permission or collaborates in creating a
copyrightable work, the performer is barred from ‘using the right of publicity’ to squelch
exploitation of that copyrighted work for its intended purpose . . . .”) (citing NIMMER & NIMMER,
supra note 160, at § 1.01(B)(3)(b)(iv)(II)).
172. See Bryant, supra note 160; see NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 160.
173. Joseph P. Bauer, Addressing the Incoherency of the Preemption Provision of the
Copyright Act of 1976, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 75 (2007).
174. Riccard, supra note 161, at 446–47.

HWANG_ARTICLE_DP_FINAL_EDIT (DO NOT DELETE)

234

4/27/2017 9:28 AM

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:2

preemption case.175 This is in fact necessary to further the underlying
principles of both federal copyright protection and the states’ right of
publicity laws: incentivizing the creation of works for the public benefit.176
A modification of Nimmer’s two-prong preemption test will help achieve
this goal.
Rather than restrict the focus of its first prong to whether or not the
use of a copyrighted work is commercially economic or expressive,177 the
“extra element” test used by some courts should be utilized to determine
whether the elements of the state right of publicity claim constitute
meaningful additional elements that give rise to a claim fundamentally and
qualitatively different from an infringement claim under federal copyright
law.178 This would allow courts to avoid the flawed outcome of the Ninth
Circuit’s reasoning in Wendt v. Host International, Inc.179 If there are no
meaningful additional elements or the additional elements do not
adequately change the nature of the claim, the plaintiff’s state claim should
be found preempted, as the right is equivalent to one of the rights protected
by federal copyright law and thus is properly subject to preemption under
Section 301.180
If additional meaningful elements are present, then courts should
proceed to Nimmer’s waiver analysis under the second prong of his test.181
However, this waiver analysis should be expanded to include situations
where individuals expressly sign waivers and contracts forfeiting their
175. Kristen E. Riccard, Comment, Product Placement or Pure Entertainment?
Critiquing a Copyright-Preemption Proposal, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 427, 457–58 (2009).
176. Id. at 458–59 (noting that the continuing creation of creative works will only
continue if parties can determine that their investments will be protected).
177. Justin B. Bryant, Article, Applying the Lessons from Dryer v. NFL: Forming a
Workable Framework for Analyzing the Right of Publicity in Professional Sports, 22 SPORTS
LAW. J. 1, 18 (2015); see MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
VOLUME 1 § 1.01(B)(3)(b)(iv)(I)–(II) (2013).
178. See Joseph P. Bauer, Addressing the Incoherency of the Preemption Provision of the
Copyright Act of 1976, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 38–39 (2007).
179. Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 810 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining the previous
holding that plaintiffs’ state law claims were not preempted by federal copyright statute if they
require additional elements different from the elements of copyright infringement).
180. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2012).
181. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 177.
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rights of publicity as performers and collaborators in the creation of
copyrighted works. If the individual waived his or her right to publicity
claim either through an expressly signed contract or implicitly through
collaboration with the express knowledge of how the copyrighted work will
be used,182 then that individual’s state right of publicity claim should be
preempted.
Applying this modified framework to Ray v. ESPN, Inc. allows for a
more coherent and deliberate arrival to the same end result of preemption
achieved by the Eighth Circuit.183 While ultimately unavailing, Ray’s
assertion that the basis of his claim is not within the subject matter of
federal copyright because it stems from the unauthorized use of his likeness
and persona184 would satisfy the “extra element” test of the modified first
prong, paralleling the Ninth Circuit determination in Downing v.
Abercrombie & Fitch.185 However, under the second prong, Ray’s claim
would fail since he would be found to have both expressly waived his right
to publicity186 and implicitly waived it by collaborating in the creation of
the copyrighted work.187 As his individual performance in the recordings
was copyrightable, his likeness could therefore not be detached from those
performances.188

182. Id.; see also Ray v. ESPN, Inc., No. 13-1179-CV-W-SOW, 2014 WL 2766187, at *5
(W.D. Mo. Apr. 8, 2014) (“When a performer gives permission or collaborates in creating a
copyrightable work, the performer is barred from ‘using the right of publicity’ to squelch
exploitation of that copyrighted work for its intended purpose . . . .”) (citing NIMMER & NIMMER,
supra note 177, at § 1.01(B)(3)(b)(iv)(II)).
183. See Ray v. ESPN, Inc., 783 F.3d 1140, 1144–45 (8th Cir. 2015) (concluding that
Ray’s state-law claims were preempted under the Copyright Act).
184. Id. at 1143.
185. Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1003 (9th Cir. 2001); see also
Bauer, supra note 178, at 72–73 (“[A]lthough the plaintiffs’ personas were embodied in the
copyrightable photographs, the subject matter of their claims was the unauthorized use of their
names and likenesses.”).
186. Ray, 783 F.3d at 1141 (“Ray specifically agreed with a representative of the UWF
that the films would be ‘sold and used.’”); Ray, 2014 WL 2766187, at *1 (“[Ray] entered into a
series of contracts . . . and each match was filmed for future use in order to generate revenue.”).
187. Ray, 2014 WL 2766187, at *5.
188. Ray, 783 F.3d at 1144.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Despite reaching the correct result, the Eighth Circuit’s analysis in
Ray v. ESPN, Inc. failed to make a mark in the development of a solid and
consistent framework for analyzing federal copyright preemption of state
law right of publicity claims. While Professor Nimmer’s framework is
useful in unifying how different courts have reached their outcomes in
federal copyright preemption of state law right of publicity issues in the
past,189 it is less useful in analyzing future preemption cases. Therefore,
with Professor Nimmer’s two-prong preemption test190 as a foundation,
courts should use the proposed modified version that, instead of restricting
the focus of Nimmer’s first prong to whether or not the use of a
copyrighted work is commercially economic or expressive,191 utilizes the
“extra element” test to determine whether the elements of the state law
right of publicity claim constitute meaningful additional elements that give
rise to a claim fundamentally and qualitatively different from an
infringement claim under federal copyright law.192

189. Kristen E. Riccard, Comment, Product Placement or Pure Entertainment?
Critiquing a Copyright-Preemption Proposal, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 427, 447–48 (2009).
190. MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT VOLUME 1 §
1.01(B)(3)(b)(iv)(I)–(II) (2013); see also Justin B. Bryant, Article, Applying the Lessons from
Dryer v. NFL: Forming a Workable Framework for Analyzing the Right of Publicity in
Professional Sports, 22 SPORTS LAW. J. 1, 18 (2015) (“Professor Nimmer proposes a two-part
test for analyzing cases where copyright, the right of publicity, and contract law intersect.”).
191. Bryant, supra note 190; see NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 190.
192. See Joseph P. Bauer, Addressing the Incoherency of the Preemption Provision of the
Copyright Act of 1976, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 38–39 (2007).

